We use panel data from 1983 to 1997 for the 42 police force areas in England and Wales to test the hypothesis that legalizing abortion contributes to lower crime rates. We provide an advance on previous work by focusing on the impact of possible endogeneity of effective abortion rates with respect to crime. Our use of U.K. data allows us to exploit regional differences in the provision of local and free abortions to identify abortion rates. When we use a similar model and estimation methodology, we are able to replicate the negative association between abortion rates and reported crime found by Donohue and Levitt for the U.S. However, when we allow for the potential endogeneity of effective abortion rates with respect to crime, we find no clear connection between the two. JEL Classifications: K42, I38, J13
similar to theirs, we are able to replicate their finding of a negative association between abortion rates and reported crime. However, when we allow for the potential endogeneity of effective abortion rates with respect to crime, we find no clear connection between the two.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides greater detail of the D & L hypothesis and discusses some of the relevant research. Section III gives a brief history of abortion policy in the U.K. Section IV follows with our model of crime and discusses the covariates included and their expected effects on crime rates. Section V discusses the estimation approach, describes the data set and presents our empirical findings. Concluding thoughts are found in section VI.
II. The Linkage between Abortion and Crime Rates.
The D & L hypothesis that changes in abortion rates may lead to changes in crime rates some years later rests on two propositions: that changes in the abortion rate will change the size of birth cohorts, as well as the composition of the cohort. The first is a rather straightforward proposition that if the abortion rate increases, ceteris paribus, the birth cohort is smaller thus leaving fewer individuals later to commit crimes. It is the second proposition that D & L stress in their paper, and which is clearly more controversial. They suggest that abortion may significantly alter the composition of birth cohorts in a way that leaves relatively fewer potential criminals than if abortion were not legally available. The reasoning behind this is twofold. First, legalized abortion allows women to better manage their fertility. That is, if a woman becomes pregnant at an inopportune time (e.g. during temporary financial difficulties, or while a student) she can terminate the pregnancy and perhaps later bear children when conditions are more favorable. The second (and somewhat related) reason abortion may reduce crime, has to do with the kind of environment that children would be born into if abortion is not available. Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) consider what kind of life the 'marginal child' might have experienced if abortion had not been the chosen course of action by the pregnant mother. Based on research using state-level data from the 1980 U.S. census and U.S. Vital Statistics, they note that the marginal child would likely have faced multiple hardships such as being, "…60 percent more likely to live in a single parent home, 50 percent more likely to live in poverty, 45 percent more likely to be in a household collecting welfare, and 40 percent more likely to die during the first year of life," (p. 265). D & L argue that legalized abortion may have reduced exposure to such hardships and ultimately caused a reduction in crime 15 to 20 years later. Or, as Levitt and Dubner summarize it in their best-selling book Freakonomics, "Legalized abortion leads to less unwantedness; unwantedness leads to high crime; legalized abortion, therefore, led to less crime." (p. 139).
Subsequent Research on the Abortion -Crime Link
Several papers have emerged following Donohue and Levitt (2001) testing the causal linkage between abortion and crime. Sen (2002) uses provincial crime data for Canada during the period 1983 to 1998 and employs a model and methodology quite similar to that of D & L.
He finds support for their theory that legalized abortion reduces violent crime. The results do not hold, however, for general property crime. He further notes that the major impact of legalized abortion was the reduction of teenage fertility rates which in turn strongly reduced crime in Canada. This result, he argues, lends support to the theory that legalized abortion affects crime rates mostly because it allows women to optimally time their pregnancies.
There has been a lively debate about Donohue and Levitt's results for the U.S. Joyce (2004a) argues that because the period D & L analyze, 1985 to 1997, coincides with the rise and fall of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the U.S. their results likely suffer from an omitted variable bias. That is, the rise and fall of crime during this period might falsely be attributed to the legalization of abortion when in fact it was due to the fluctuations in the crack-cocaine market.
Joyce uses a difference-in-difference approach and examines crime rates of cohorts born just before and after abortion legalization. His results show no crime reducing effects from abortion legalization. Donohue and Levitt (2004) respond to Joyce's criticism of their earlier work. They note that Joyce's decision to focus on the period of 1985 to 1990, without adequate controls for crackcocaine usage has led to an omitted variables bias in his estimates. The authors then show that, using the same technique as Joyce (2004a) but extending the data set on either side to include earlier and later years, the crime-reducing effects of abortion re-emerge. Joyce (2004b) argues that some predictions of the abortion-crime relationship proposed by D & L do not survive further scrutiny. First, Joyce argues that U.S crime should have fallen sharply as cohorts born soon after legalization reached peak ages of criminal activity i.e. 15 to 24. Crime did not fall in the manner expected. Second, the impact of abortion legalization on fertility rates was higher for blacks than for whites. Yet this does not translate into any racial differences in reported crime rates.
Most recently, a paper by Foote and Goetz (2005) Essentially, the debate over the (potential) impact of abortion on crime centers on the extent to which the hardships described by Gruber, Levine and Staiger (1999) translate into higher crime rates and how the legalization of abortion may reduce the occurrence of those hardships among birth cohorts. This study addresses this subject by investigating the relationship between abortion and crime rates for England and Wales. The difference-indifferences methodology, as applied to before-and after-legislation changes has recently been generally criticized by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) as estimates of regime changes tend to understate standard errors on the legislation coefficient. 4 Given this critique, and since we wish to replicate D & L's study as closely as possible for England and Wales, we develop our econometric analysis using data on access to abortion rather than changes in legislation.
Endogenous Abortion Rates
A key issue not addressed in the existing literature is the possibility that effective abortion rates may be endogenous to crime. The basic argument is that environmental factors that influence decisions by women regarding pregnancy, birth and abortion are also likely to affect the likelihood that children of these women commit crime in subsequent years. Economic and social resources (defined in a wide sense) available to a (potential) mother are important factors that affect firstly whether or not she gets pregnant and secondly whether or not she has an abortion. However, these same factors will also determine the amount of resources that are available to invest in any child that is born which will turn affect the likelihood that the child commits crime in subsequent years. 5 It is possible that poorly resourced areas (leading to higher crime in the future) will have higher abortion rates and this may confound a (true) negative correlation between abortion & crime. In fact, there is considerable evidence that although conception rates are higher among teenagers from deprived areas, conceptions (particularly amongst teenagers) to such women are far less likely to end in abortion than conceptions to better qualified women, those in higher socio-economic groups and those with higher occupational aspirations (see, for example, Lo et al, 1994; Lee et al, 2004) .
We illustrate this point by examining how current values of some of the covariates we use in our model of crime below affect actual birth and abortion rates. We estimate separate fixed-effects panel data regressions of birth rates and abortion ratios (abortions as a percentage of births) in the 42 police force areas on the log of the real average wage, the male unemployment rate and the proportion of children in local authority care. 6 The key results are as follows: birth rate it = 1.079** real wage + 0.038*** unemployment + 0.106*** care + … (0.447) (0.011) (0.017) abortion ratio it = 0.243*** real wage -0.003*** unemployment -0.010*** care + ...
(0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (Note: Standard errors in brackets; *** indicates p-value < 0.01.) & L (2001) did not use a difference-in-difference method, preferring instead to model differences in access to abortion across states. 5 A number of researchers (Lochner, 2004; Levitt and Lochner, 2000) have noted how parental characteristics and background are important determinants of crime, albeit there is no consensus on the precise effect of particular characteristics. 6 The regressions are run on data between 1983 to 1990. Full data on these variables are not available for earlier years. Fixed-effects are included for both years and local authorities. Standard errors are adjusted to allow for first order serial correlation, correlation across local authorities and for heteroscedasticity within and across local authorities. Full details of these regressions are available on request.
Wages are positively associated with both birth and abortion rates. The unemployment rate and the proportion of children in care display a significantly positive association with birth rates, but a significantly negative association with abortion ratios. 7 In other words, if an area experiences a relative increase in deprivation (as measured by any of these three variables) in year t, the effective abortion ratio (as measured by D & L) in subsequent years would be likely to decrease.
The reduction of resources to invest in children born in year t means that crime rates in subsequent years are also likely to be higher. In this case, we would observe a spurious negative correlation between effective abortion rates and crime.
It is possible that other variables will impact on effective abortion rates in a different manner and, if so, the overall direction of bias in the abortion-crime relationship is uncertain.
What is clear, however, is that endogeneity is potentially very important and any analysis of the abortion and crime link needs to make a serious effort to identify the impact of access to separately from the demand for abortion.
III. Abortion in the U.K.
The 1967 Abortion Act decriminalized abortion in Great Britain under certain conditions, the most important being that two doctors state in good faith that continuation of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or to any existing children of the pregnant woman. Many 7 The same correlation is observed between these three variables and the abortion rate per population aged 15-44. Hence, re-specifying the effective abortion rate using population (rather than births) as the deflator would not solve the problem. Additional regressions using births and abortions to women aged under 18 suggest a similar impact for educational achievement. Specifically, an increase in the proportion of people leaving school at 16 with no qualifications is associated with a higher teenage birth rate, but a lower abortion ratio. Again, full details are available on request.
doctors have interpreted this clause as permitting abortion in any case. However, as we will see below, the requirement for the involvement of two doctors is an important element of our identification strategy. Prior to 1967, and following a landmark Court Case in 1938, a small number of abortions were permitted on serious medical grounds.
The Abortion Act came into force in April 1968 and applied to England, Scotland and Wales, but not to Northern Ireland. The only major amendment to the Act came in 1991 in which a formal time limit on abortions of 24 weeks was imposed, with the exception of certain cases, most particularly when the fetus is thought to be at risk of being born with physical or mental abnormalities, in which abortion is permitted at any stage.
During 1969, the first full year in which the Abortion Act was in place, 49,829 abortions were carried out on residents in England and Wales. This increased rapidly to over 100,000 by 1972 and then more gradually to about 170,000 in 1989. From this point onwards, the annual number of abortions on residents has remained relatively stable.
A natural question is whether the 1967 Act actually led to a significant increase in the total number of abortions. For obvious reasons, illegal abortions are not reported in official statistics. However, based on maternal deaths and morbidity statistics, Goodhart (1969; 1972) concludes that between 10,000 and 20,000 illegal abortions were taking place in the U.K. each
year, although a proportion of these would have been on overseas residents. 8 Further, Cavadino (1976) presents strong evidence that significant numbers of illegal abortions continued to take place even after legalization in 1968. Taken together the evidence suggests that the 1967 Abortion Act led to an increase in the order of magnitude of abortions being carried out on residents in England Wales. Certainly, the likelihood of measurement error from illegal abortion needs to be borne in mind when interpreting our empirical estimates below. On the other hand, the most relevant feature of the 1967 Act for this paper is the dramatic increase in abortions provided free of charge on the National Health Service (NHS). Prior to the Abortion Act, in the region of 3,000 abortions were performed in NHS hospitals in the U.K. per year (Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 1966) whilst by 1972 this figure had risen to around 57,000. Hence, there was a major shift in the availability and monetary cost of abortions for women in socio-economics groups in which crime is most prevalent.
A necessary condition for abortion to affect crime is that abortion should affect fertility.
We show that this is the case for England and Wales by regressing the birth rate for women aged The coefficient on ABORTION TREND is significant at the 1% level, a finding which is confirmed for similar regressions run for women aged 15 to 19 and for unmarried women aged 15 to 19 and 15 to 44. These regressions offer strong evidence that the legalization of abortion did contribute to declining fertility in England and Wales.
Identifying Abortion Access
There are several features which distinguish the practice of abortion law in the U.K. from other countries such as the U.S. and which assist us in identifying the impact of the level of access to abortion from the number of abortions that are carried out. Most importantly, abortions can be obtained either from the National Health Service (NHS) or from private operators.
Although private abortions are provided on a commercial basis, in principal, NHS abortions are available free of charge to any woman irrespective of income or wealth. In order to obtain an NHS abortion, a woman has to be referred by her general practitioner to an appropriate surgeon at an NHS hospital.
In practice, the level of availability of NHS abortion services has differed widely across regions and over time and this has been a constant source of concern for campaigners in favor of abortion. 9 There are several reasons for this. As most NHS care is provided free at the point of use, health authorities have to take strategic decisions about where they will allocate scarce resources. The priority that is given to abortion services has historically varied quite considerably both across authorities and over time. These variations have been enhanced by two factors, firstly the fact that medical personnel have a statutory right to opt out of involvement in abortion if they have a conscientious objection to the procedure and, secondly, differences in the strictness with which doctors have applied the conditions for abortion in the 1967 Act. In some cases, this means that some women are refused an NHS abortion in their area of residence. In these cases, women may be able to obtain a referral to an NHS provider outside their area of residence or may pay for the services of a private provider. In general, a private provider will very rarely refuse to offer a woman an abortion under the terms of the 1967 Act. However, in many parts of the country, private provision is scarce or non-existent meaning that, for many women, the use of a private provider implies significant travel costs.
The potential importance of local provision of abortion for the analysis of crime should not be underestimated. Women from poorer and less educated socio-economic groups are less likely to be able to afford the relatively high cost of private abortion or the additional costs of traveling outside their region of residence to access abortion. Children born to women in these groups are also likely to be at a relatively high risk of committing crime. Lane (1974) reports evidence from several studies that in the early years of operation of the abortion act, about two thirds of women who were refused an NHS abortion went on to give birth and that, of these, just one quarter had the baby fostered or adopted. Clearly, access to local abortion is likely to be an important driver of any link between abortion and crime in the U.K.
Abortion Data
In contrast to many parts of the U.S., health authorities in the U.K. have a statutory requirement to report every legal abortion, whether carried out on the NHS or privately. As a consequence, a complete set of data is available from the Department of Health on the number of abortions performed in each region, broken down by the age, marital status, place of residence of the mother and type of provider -NHS or private.
We follow Donohue and Levitt in constructing measures of effective abortion rates, weighted by the age profile of the criminal population. Abortions can be expected to have an impact on crime rates only when the children who have been aborted would have been old enough to commit crimes. Hence, we firstly calculate the annual abortion rate as a proportion of live births in each police force area. By using lagged values, this provides us with the abortion rate (AR i,j,t ) in area i for any age, j, in the current year, t:
The potential impact of a high abortion rate for any particular cohort will depend on how prevalent crime is amongst that cohort. For this reason, we calculate the effective abortion rate (EAR j,t ) as the weighted sum of the abortion rate of each age group:
where W j is the percentage of crime that is committed by cohort j in area i. The weights are derived from data published by the Home Office on numbers cautioned or found guilty for different crime categories for each area in each year. The weights we use vary for different crime categories and for each of the 42 police force areas but are constant across years. 10 If abortion really does have an impact on crime, then the age distribution of crime may be endogenous to abortion. This would suggest that we construct the weights using data from a period before abortion could have had an impact and this is the procedure followed by Donohue and Levitt. However, the age distribution of crime may also vary over time for other reasons. In this case, relying on pre-abortion weights may bias the results. We experiment with three 10 Appendix A provides an example of how the effective abortion rate is calculated. We aggregate the abortion data up to the police force area, the only level at which crime data are available. The police force area boundaries have not changed since 1974. The abortion data are sufficiently disaggregated to allow us to match the 1974 boundaries. For five police force areas the matching is not perfect for data prior to 1974. In each of these cases, only a small part of the police force area was affected. The results reported below are robust to exclusion of these areas. different sets of crime weights. The first set is based on data from 1979 to 1980, before abortion could possibly have an impact. The second is based on data from 1998 to 2001, the years immediately after our sample. The third is the weighted mean of the first two. In practice we find that our results are not at all sensitive to the choice of weights and all the results reported here are based on the third set. Figure 1 plots the abortion ratio (abortions to 1000 live births) from 1976 to 1990, and the effective abortion rate from 1976 to 1997.
IV. The Model of Crime
In order to investigate the possible linkage between crime and abortion we consider the following model (which bears close resemblance to D & L):
where Crime it is the crime rate (total and by sub-category) for police force area i in year t. The measure EAR it is the effective abortion rate as described above. The vector X it contains a number of covariates designed to control for various factors that may affect crime rates (discussed in detail below). The variables γ i and v t are included to control for police force area and year fixedeffects, respectively.
Covariates
The variables included in vector X it are motivated by work on the economic analysis of crime pioneered by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) (see Freeman (1999) for a survey). This analysis views crime as either a risky gamble or a time allocation problem analogous to the work-leisure decision in the theory of labor supply. The latter direction has become popular in theoretical and empirical work and this is the approach we follow here. 11 Essentially, an individual faces a choice between legal market work and crime. Crime is chosen when the difference between the expected return from crime and the expected return from market work exceeds an exogenous threshold. As the difference in expected returns increases then more individuals choose crime over market work and the aggregate supply of crime is then decreasing in labor market opportunities. However, the aggregate demand for crime is determined by the supply of resources that can be acquired through crime and transformed into monetary gains i.e. the supply of loot. As both income and wealth in a region increase, so the demand for crime increases. This theory has been viewed as primarily applicable to property crime, and empirical evidence is more plentiful for this type of crime, but some authors argue that the theory can be extended to embrace violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002) .
In our data set we have region-level statistics on two variables which capture labor market opportunities (log average weekly earnings and male unemployment rate) and a proxy for regional wealth given by the number of cars per capita. 12 The net effect of regional income on crime is ambiguous since increased earnings will raise the demand for crime (more income translates into more consumption goods to steal) and will reduce the supply of crime as expected returns from market work rise relative to expected returns to crime. Using U.S county-level data Gould et al. (2002) find strong evidence that higher wages are associated with lower crime rates. 13 Similarly, an increase in the unemployment rate is predicted to increase the supply of crime (expected returns from legal market work decline) and lower the demand for crime (rising unemployment is associated with reduced consumption) giving an ambiguous net effect. 11 The time-allocation model of crime is summarized by Deadman and Pyle (2000) . 12 See Appendix B for detailed variable descriptions and sources.
Empirical evidence from regional panel data tends to support a positive influence of unemployment on property crime. Examples are Levitt (1996) , Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, (2001) and Gould et al. (2002) for the U.S, Witt et al., (1999) and Carmichael and Ward (2001) for the U.K and Edmark (2005) for Sweden. An exception which finds a negative correlation between unemployment and crime for some theft categories is Entorf and Spengler (2000) for former West German states. The use of both average earnings and unemployment rate as covariates should in principle allow us to obtain an estimated effect of unemployment on crime through the supply of crime rather than the indirect negative effect via demand for crime (Edmark, 2005) . Hence, we predict that male unemployment has a positive influence on crime rates. 14 Increased wealth raises the demand for crime as more 'loot' is available. We lack a precise measure of regional wealth but we do have a useful proxy for wealth in the form of number of registered motor vehicles by private individuals per capita. Car ownership appears in the Witt et al. (1999) study of regional crime rates in England and Wales. They find a significant positive effect of car ownership on property crime rates and interpreted this to reflect higher demand for crime as car ownership increased over the period 1983 to 1996. For vehicle crime, defined in England and Wales as 'theft of or from a motor vehicle' and an important part of our theft category, the proposition that increased car ownership is associated with greater crime rates has strong intuitive appeal.
The supply of crime is predicted to fall as the expected costs of punishment rise. The latter is a combination of expected probability of being caught and expected severity of 14 The use of male unemployment rates is partly due to greater consistency of definition and coverage over time for men and the fact that the overwhelming majority of crimes are committed by (young) men; crime rates are then likely to respond more to male unemployment rates than total unemployment rates. The unemployment rate is not logged in our estimations. punishment, through fines or jail sentence and the adverse impacts on labor market opportunities that go with a criminal conviction. We lack suitable sentencing and prison population data that would match our crime data. In England and Wales, offenders are often tried and incarcerated in courts and prisons in regions different to the police force areas where the crimes were committed. D & L used a measure of prison population in their empirical analysis. We have just one measure of cost of punishment, which is the number of police in a police force area. We expect that a greater number of police will be associated with an increased probability of catching criminals and hence an increased expected cost of committing crime. Therefore, increased police strength is predicted to lower crime rates. However, we must be wary of the concern of Levitt (1997) that police strength may respond positively to increased crime rates as citizens demand greater police protection and express this through voting behavior. Here, we endeavor to reduce this endogeneity bias by using the log of number of police per capita, lagged one period. For England and Wales, Witt et al. (1999) found, using a similar measure to ours, that increased police strength was associated with reduced property crime rates.
The final covariate that we use, not present in D & L, is a measure of social deprivation: the rate, per 1,000 people under 18 years, of children in local authority care. In England and Wales, children whose parents are deemed unfit to provide for care (e.g. because of violence or drug abuse) can be placed under the care of local authorities, either in care homes or with foster parents. The proportion of children in such care is a proxy for poor social conditions which might be conducive to increased crime since the stocks of human and social capital will be relatively low in areas with greater social deprivation. 15
V. The Data Set, Estimation Approach and Empirical Findings

Data Description
The panel data employed covers the 42 police force areas over the years 1983 through 1997, a period for which data on all variables were available. We work with two data sets: recorded crime and cautions plus guilty data. 16 Inspection of the data suggests that measurement error is greater for the cautions plus guilty set than the recorded crime data and our regression analysis is focused on the latter category. 17 Table 1a shows a breakdown of recorded crime by type and period, Table 1b provides summary statistics for recorded crime rates, cautions plus guilty rates, and the covariates. between 1986 and 1988, increased rapidly up to 1992 followed by a significant decline thereafter. Violent crime, on the other hand, increased more or less consistently over the whole period, a pattern which contrasts strongly with that reported for the U.S. Figure 3 reports a similar time series plot for total number of cautions plus the total number of people found guilty 15 Two covariates were experimented with but dropped due to lack of significant coefficients. These were ratio of 75 th to 25 th percentile weekly earnings (highly correlated with average earnings) and proportion of school-leavers with no formal qualifications to proxy low levels of human capital. 16 Some data on victim reports of crime are available from the British Crime Victim Survey but these are not available either as a panel or on a consistent annual basis. Although there are concerns about the rigor and accuracy with which reported crime offences are compiled (Macdonald, 2002) we have no other source of data appropriate to panel data modeling and close enough to the approach taken by D & L. We assume therefore that any errors in crime reporting do not produce biases in our estimated coefficients and standard errors. Any deviations in crime reporting across police forces will then be picked up in area fixed-effects. 17 For example, it seems that cautions data are under-recorded for some large police force areas (London, Merseyside, Northumbria) in the 1979-82 period. Although cautions and guilty data are reported by age groups, in the courts that year expressed as rates per 100,000 population and then as index numbers with 1977 = 100. We show plots for three age groups: ages 10 to 15, ages 16 to 20 and ages 21 and over. These age bands are constructed on the basis of similarity in graph plots by particular year of age. The plots are not supportive of a link between abortion and crime. The decrease in cautions and guilty for the 10-15 age group cannot be due to abortion as the plot decreases too late; if abortion plays a part then the decrease should start earlier around 1980 to 1982, unless there is a considerable delay in abortion impact. The plots for the 16 to 20 and 21 and over categories show no downward trend and appear to move up and down together. For abortion legalization to have an affect, we would predict that one plot would follow the other downwards.
<<figure 2>>
<<figure 3>>
The significant decreases in murder, violent and property crime in the U.S. starting from 1991 -eighteen years after the end of the 1973 Supreme Court ruling abolishing restrictions on abortion -are a key part of the D & L case that abortion legalization reduced crime. As abortion in the U.K. was legalized five years earlier than in the US, if legalization has the causal effect of reducing crime, we would expect the downward trend in crime to occur five years earlier in the U.K. than in the U.S. The fact that, at least for total and property crime, we observe almost exactly the same timing in crime trends in the U.K. is somewhat problematic for an abortioncrime link.
There are (at least) three alternative explanations for the observed patterns in crime trends across the two countries: 1. Abortion legalization reduced crime in the U.S. but not the U.K. 2.
Abortion did reduce crime in the U.K., but other factors have swamped the time series which might appear advantageous when analyzing abortion impacts, the boundaries of the age bands vary over our sample period, particularly for youths aged 15 to 21 years. relationship. 3. Abortion did not reduce crime either in the U.K. or the U.S. and any negative correlation between abortion and crime is spurious. In the empirical part of this paper, we test the first hypothesis by attempting to correlate changes in abortion rates within regions of the U.K. with changes in subsequent crime rates. A significant negative correlation between abortion and crime rates (as found by D & L for the U.S.) would be evidence against a differential effect between the two countries. We also attempt to test for a spurious relationship between abortion and crime by modelling abortion rates as endogenous and using suitable instruments to identify their effect on crime.
Estimation Approach
We begin our estimation of equation (3) by adopting the same method employed in D & L, namely we estimate a fixed-effects model with year dummies. The data are weighted by area population and we assume an AR(1) error structure -we refer to these as simply the 'fixedeffects' results.
One concern is that the disturbances in equation (3) are possibly correlated across time and space. For example, crime in one police force area may be committed by residents of a neighboring area. Consequently, our next approach is to estimate regressions controlling for such spatial correlation using the panel-corrected standard errors method as described by Beck and Katz (1995) . Once again we allow for area fixed-effects, year dummies and an AR(1) error structure. We refer to these as the 'PCSE' regression results.
Our third estimation method is to consider the possibility that our variable of primary interest-effective abortion rates (or EAR it in equation (3))-may be endogenous to crime. In order to do this, we need to use variables that reflect changes in the supply of rather than demand for abortion. As discussed above, suitable data exist for the U.K. on free provision of abortion on the NHS and provision in the patient's area of residence. Thus, our third approach is to estimate equation (3) using an instrumental variables (two-stage least-squares) method with Newey-West standard errors and using RATIONHS and RATIOHOME (discussed in detail below) as our instruments. Once more, we model the error structure as an AR(1) and including area fixed-effects and year effects. We refer to these as IV regressions.
In each case, regressions are performed for total recorded crime rates and separately for seven subcategories (violence, sex, burglary, robbery, theft, fraud and damage). 18
Choice of Instruments
We use two instruments to identify abortion access. The first is the number of abortions (NHS and private) that are performed in the health authority of residence relative to the number obtained outside the area (RATIOHOME). The second is the number of NHS abortions that are obtained by women resident in each area relative to non-NHS abortions (RATIONHS). We expect RATIOHOME to be positively correlated with abortion rates. As local NHS abortions are already included in RATIOHOME, the expected direction of correlation for RATIONHS is indeterminate depending on the relative impact of local private abortions and out-of-area NHS abortions. There is a long tradition of using these variables to measure abortion access in the U.K. are (see Fowkes, Catford and Logan, 1979; Lane, 1974, pp. 21-24) . Although they may be partially influenced by the demand for abortion, medical practitioners working in this field and academic observers have argued strongly that exogenous supply side factors explain the vast amount of variation in the measures. For example, Fowkes et al (1979, p.219) argue that "most of the variation [in proportions of residents having an abortion in their home region] is probably due to the inequality in the provision of abortion services". Further, Fowkes argues that the inequality in provision is exogenous to abortion demand and determined by the number of general practitioners in the region who are not prepared to refer women for abortions, and the numbers of gynecologists who exercise their right to opt out of performing abortions. Paintin (1985) supports this argument, claiming that "the most important factor influencing the availability of … abortion is the attitude of senior gynaecologists". Paintin contrasts the situations of West Midlands in the 1970s where the professor obstetrics and gynecology …"was a noted opponent of liberal abortion and his attitude was reflected by other senior gynecologists in the region" with that in the north east where gynecologists "strongly supported abortion for social reasons". Indeed, the contrast in the proportion of local NHS abortions in those two regions is striking. For example, in 1975, the proportion of abortions to residents of the West Midlands police force area that took place locally on the NHS was around 10% compared to over 90% in the North East.
In Table 1c we report summary statistics for the log of total crime, for effective abortion rates and for our two instruments. In the Table we show how each of these varies within regions over time, between regions and also between regions over time. Importantly in the context of our panel data regressions below, there is considerable significant variation in both our instruments even when we control for regional and year fixed-effects.
For each IV regression, we report more formal tests for instrumental validity. These are, first, the C test of exogeneity of effective abortion rates, the partial R-squared and (associated Ftest) of the importance of the instruments on effective abortion rates in the first stage regression, Hansen's J-test of overidentifying restrictions and the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for underidentification. As Hall et al (1996) note, even if this test rejects the null of underidentification, IV estimators may still be subject to bias from weak instruments. Hence, we also calculate the Cragg-Donald statistic for weak instruments (see Stock and Yogo, 2002) . The statistic is consistently above the 5% critical values calculated by Stock and Yogo, suggesting that we do not have a weak instrument problem in this case. 19
Empirical Results
Tables 2 through 4 contain the estimation results for these three models using data on recorded crime (by total and sub-categories). The fixed-effects model, which is closest to that reported by D & L is reported in Table 2 . Effective abortion rates are associated with significantly lower recorded rates of total crime and of burglaries, robberies and theft. Abortion is positively and significantly associated with rates of sex crimes and fraud. No significant association (using a 5% significance level) is found for rates of violence and damage. In these models, unemployment and children-in-care are associated with significantly higher crime both in total and for least some sub-categories.
The sign and significance of results for the PCSE models (reported in Table 3 ) are fairly similar to those for fixed-effects. In general, the abortion coefficients are larger in magnitude than for the fixed-effects model, whilst the positive effect of abortion on violent crime rates is now statistically significant.
The IV results (reported in Table 4 ) differ considerably from the fixed-effects and PCSE results, particularly in relation to abortion. The C test statistic is strongly significant for total crime and for all sub-categories except sex crimes and damage. Thus, there is evidence against dependent variable. abortion rates being exogenous to crime. For total crime and for most sub-categories, the coefficient on abortion is now statistically insignificant. The exceptions are violent crime for which the coefficient is significantly negative and fraud for which the coefficient is significantly positive. Male unemployment rate and children in care continue to have generally positive and significant coefficients. The final point to note with the IV results is that the log of police per capita is now estimated to have a negative and significant impact on recorded crime.
Robustness Checks
The results in Tables 5 present robustness checks using the same three models for total recorded crime. The first check is to exclude London. The rationale for this is that London is characterized by an extremely mobile population and experiences very high rates of migration to and from other areas of the U.K. as well as from other countries. As a result, any correlation between abortion and subsequent crime is likely to be very diluted and difficult to pick up. The next checks are to estimate the models using abortions to single women and to teenagers. To the extent that crime is relatively more prevalent amongst offspring of these groups, one would expect any correlation between abortion and crime to be strongest in these regressions. For reasons of space, the discussion of these results is restricted to the abortion coefficients. 20
These robustness checks lead to mixed results. For single women and teenage abortions, the abortion coefficients in the fixed-effects and PCSE models continue to be negative and strongly significant. Furthermore, these regressions produce larger coefficients (in absolute terms) in comparison to their counterparts shown in Tables 2 and 3 . These results, on their own, would seem to support a crime-reducing effect of legalized abortion. The robustness check that 19 Results available upon request. 20 A complete set of results for all covariates and sub-categories for crime are available from the authors. excludes London, however, produces insignificant coefficients on effective abortion rates for both the fixed-effects and PCSE regressions. Furthermore, in all three cases the C test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity and the coefficients on abortion for the IV models are not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Our next robustness check is to include area-specific trends in the total crime regressions.
As reported in Table 5 , the FE and PCSE regressions produce negative coefficients for abortion, with only the former being significant. The IV regression produces a positive, significant coefficient. The Hansen J test of the overidentifying restrictions, however, does not allow us to say that the instruments we employ are valid in this regression and thus casts doubt over these results. Wooldridge (2002) notes that the first difference estimator will be more efficient than the fixed-effects estimator in the context of serial correlation. Consequently, Table 5 also reports estimates of the three models using first differences. 21 The coefficients on abortion are of similar order of magnitude and sign to those using the fixed-effects estimator, but are never statistically significant. The C test, once again, rejects exogeneity and the IV estimation produces a positive, significant coefficient for the effective abortion rate.
The final experiment (reported in Table 6 ) uses the cautions plus guilty data set as an alternative measure of crime. The data are pooled over age groups 10 to 13, 14 to 16, 17 to 20 and 21 years & over, with effective abortion measures being computed by age-group specific weights. In addition, the other covariates are interacted with age group dummy variables to allow for variation in effects by age. This specification enables differences in effective abortion rates between age groups to help identify any abortion-crime effect. Furthermore, following Foote and Goetz (2005) , we control for area-year effects in all three regressions. The table reports the estimated coefficients for the effective abortion rate and relevant test statistics for the three models: fixed-effects, PCSE and IV. 22 Across the three models, the estimated coefficients for the effective abortion rate exhibit a similar pattern to the results for the recorded crime data.
We have negative, significant coefficients for the fixed-effects and panel-corrected standard error models (albeit only significant at the 10% level in the latter), but a positive, insignificant coefficient for the instrumental variables regression. Also in line with the recorded crime regressions, the C test for exogeneity suggests that abortion is endogenous. Unlike our IV estimations for the recorded crime, however, the instruments perform poorly (based on the Anderson canonical correlations LR and the partial R-squared tests) in the regression using the cautions and guilty data. Thus, again we find evidence of endogeneity of abortion, but in this case our IV results are unreliable. The poor performance is most likely due to the inclusion of year-specific fixed effects which removes most of the variation from the instruments.
One final point that is worth noting relates to the aforementioned criticisms that Foote and Goetz (2005) put forth regarding the D & L results. As noted earlier, when Foote and Goetz re-estimate the D & L model, but use per capita arrest rates and include state-year effects, the abortion rate becomes insignificant. In contrast our regressions for the FE and PCSE models, which use per capita rates and include area-year effects produce negative, significant coefficients to the effective abortion rate.
VI. Discussion and Conclusions
The claims in Donohue and Levitt (2001) that the legalization of abortion in the U.S. in the 1970s led to a subsequent reduction in crime in the 1990s caused a significant stir among economists, criminologists and others. The goal of this paper was to put the D & L hypothesis to test in a different environment, namely the U.K.
Of the many results presented in this paper, there are two things we can say with confidence. First, increased unemployment rates are associated with increased crime. Second, the greater the proportion of children in care (our proxy for 'social deprivation'), the greater the crime rate. These results are remarkably consistent and robust to various estimation methods.
We are unable to say with confidence, however, that abortion legalization in the U.K. significantly reduced crime in England and Wales some twenty years hence. We come to this conclusion by first noting, as we did earlier, that total recorded crime in the U.K. began to decrease at about the same time as in the U.S., despite the fact that abortion legalization occurred about five years earlier. Thus we have a discrepancy in the timing of the potential effect of abortion on crime between the U.S. and the U.K. On the other hand, regression models linking effective abortion rates in the U.K. and subsequent recorded crime suggest the same negative and significant correlation between the two variables (at least for total crime and some subcategories) as that reported for the U.S. by D & L.
We hypothesized above that this pattern of results might be explained in one of two ways: first, that abortion reduced crime in both the U.K. and the U.S. but that the timing of the relationship in the U.K. is obscured by other variables or, second, that abortion did not reduce crime in either the U.K. or the U.S. and the negative correlation observed in the regressions was spurious one. We test this latter explanation by modeling abortion rates as endogenous to crime.
In this approach, we identify abortion rates using on the proportion of abortions provided in the patient's area of residence and the proportion provided free of charge. When abortion is treated as being endogenous, the negative correlation between abortion rates and crime disappears.
Although these results are consistent with the correlation between abortion and crime being spurious, the validity of the IV results depends on the validity and strength of the instruments.
Anecdotal evidence and formal statistical tests lead to us to have considerable confidence both in the strength and validity of our instruments in the recorded crime regressions (but somewhat less confidence in the cautions plus guilty regressions). However, future research might usefully explore this issue further by attempting to identify explicitly unobservable variables that may explain both variation in abortion rates and variation in subsequent crime.
In any case, puzzles remain that need explanation. In particular, to be able to discount the abortion-crime link satisfactorily, researchers would need to identify more fully the social phenomenon that led to reductions in at least some crime categories in the early 1990s both in the U.K. and the U.S. In general, we believe that an examination of alternative regulatory environments is a fruitful direction for researchers who want to improve our understanding of the link between abortion and crime.
Lastly, it must be noted that few of our results are robust to different specifications and samples. For example, the significant negative correlation between abortion and crime rates in the exogenous models does not hold for some sub-categories (e.g. violent and sex crimes) and is not robust to some other specifications (excluding London, area-specific trends and firstdifference estimation). Similarly, although the finding of no significant correlation between abortion and crime in the endogenous models is somewhat more robust to our various experiments, we do find evidence of a negative correlation between abortion and violent crime in some specifications.
The fragility of the results in this paper serve to emphasize the difficulty researchers have in identifying causal effects of social change such as abortion legalization on crime rates some years hence, particularly given the myriad of other social changes occurring over the same time and which may dilute any effect. dummies and are estimated using population weights for 1990. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. First-order autocorrelation test is based on Wooldridge (2002, pp.282-283) with the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation. (1) error structure. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 16.00 (0.000) Observations\Areas: 588\42 588\42 588\42 The estimated coefficients for the effective abortion rate are shown with the standard errors (appropriate for each model) appearing in brackets. The pvalues for related tests appear in parenthesis. ^: OLS estimates appear in the Fixed-Effects column. Complete results available from the authors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Abortion data
All data on abortion are taken from the Abortion Statistics annual reference volumes published by the Office for National Statistics.
Police strength
Numbers of police officers in each police force area were obtained from Police Officer Strength England and Wales, House of Commons Library Research Paper 01/28, 2001.
Population
Population numbers for police force areas were derived by adding county data taken from 
Male unemployment rate
This series was obtained from NOMIS, the National On-line Manpower Information Service based at the University of Durham. The denominator is the male labor force actively seeking work. Labor force weights are used to aggregate counties into police force areas.
Cars
Numbers of car registrations as collected by the U.K. Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and reported in annual editions of Regional Trends. Figures are weighted by 1000 population.
Children in care
Number of children, under 18, in local authority care per 1000 resident population under 18.
Figures were obtained from Regional Trends. Population weights were used to combine counties into police force areas.
